Abstract
Introduction
The economic effects of military spending continue to be the subject of considerable debate in the literature where the impact of military expenditure is frequently found either to be nonsignificant or negative. 1 How do these effects vary across economies? And what factors drive the heterogeneity of military spending effects? These questions continue to be an important focus for research as it is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the resources it takes up, especially when countries need some level of security to deal with internal and external threats inducing positive externalities for the military spending and growth relationship.
This analysis reproduces many of results of the existing literature using recent advances in panel estimation methods and a large panel dataset which employs unique data on military spending and variety of conflict measures. The investigation shows that the differential impact of military expenditure is increasing and significant not only for external threat levels, but also internal threat levels. In addition, extending the concept of the resource-conflict link, the analysis contributes to the defence literature by showing that the impact of military expenditure on growth is less detrimental for countries with large natural resource wealth once corruption levels are accounted for. The analysis also addresses the concerns from the resource-conflict literature regarding endogenous behaviour of natural resources, with findings that suggest a significant positive impact of natural resource wealth on conflict.
Theoretical literature has allowed the identification of a number of channels through which military spending can impact the economy -such as labour, capital, technology, external relations, socio-political effects, debt and conflicts (see Dunne and Uye, 2009 ). The relative importance and sign of these effects, as well as the overall impact on growth can only be ascertained by empirical analysis.
An important issue distinguished in empirical literature is the identification problem that results from the feature that security threats may influence observed changes in both military spending and economic growth. Aizenman and Glick (2006) explain the presence of these non-linearities showing that while growth falls with higher levels of military spending, its impact is positive in the presence of external threats.
Therefore there are many reasons to believe that high levels of resource wealth may generate high demand for military protection since the military performs as a premium guard against the internal and external risk that a country may face with. In addition, having natural resources can also reduce the opportunity costs of increasing military spending and building up the military-industrial complex facilitating to strengthen the ability of the military to protect the national security and natural resources (Ali et al., 2013; Dunne and Tian, 2013) .
Hence, it is not always easy to distinguish between the various mechanisms connecting resources to conflict. On one hand, while the income from resource abundance may serve as an incentive for rebellion activity, one may also argue that it proxies for the "effectiveness of the state" (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . Along with these complications, there is a literature that involves resource scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict (Homer- Dixon, 1999; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009 ). Another concern in the literature is that resource rents, as in Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) may be endogenous with respect to conflict.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The methodology and data employed are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the estimation results and Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Methodology
The analysis employs the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This approach has advantage to address the issues of potential biases induced by country specific effects, and of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation which is especially important here because of the link between military spending and conflict, i.e. if military expenditure is reacting to an increased threat of conflict, then the ultimate cause of the reduced growth might be the threat of conflict itself rather than the observed military expenditure. 4 Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is not driven by the number of motives, along with other potential conflict triggers. The theoretical foundation of these perspectives may be traced back to Grossman (1991) and Hirschleifer (1995) . 4 Along with coefficient estimates obtained using GMM system estimator, the tables also report three tests of the validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen's (1982) J test of over-identification; and Arellano and Bond's (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that error term is not serially instruments, the analysis employs the "1 lag restriction" technique introduced by Roodman (2009) that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments. The treatment of each regressor according to their exogeneity levels is based on upper and lower bound conditions (Roodman, 2006) .
The benchmark analysis follows a similar specification used by Aizenman and Glick (2006) which provides evidence of a non-linear growth effect of military expenditure, which allows the presence of threats to security. 5 Starting from this benchmark, the analysis confirms the presence of conflict risks and government performance as potential sources of positive externalities for military spending and growth relationship, and then looks at the interaction between military expenditure and natural resources as a channel through conflict, also accounting for the potential adverse effect that might be generated by poor governance, namely by rent-seeking or corruption activities.
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the estimated model can be written as
where y is log of real per capita income, mil it is military spending, X it is the vector of variables interacted with military spending expressed as either threat, corruption or natural resource wealth, Z it is a vector of additional control variables, μ t is a period-specific constant, ξ i is an unobserved country-specific effect, and ε it is an error term.
The hypothesis is that θ 1 <0 and θ 2 >0 implying that the impact of military expenditure θ 1 + θ 2 *X it is less negative at high levels of threat, government performance and natural resource wealth. Moreover, as θ 1 and θ 2 have opposite signs, a threshold effect arises:
correlated; and AR (2) test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be rejected. In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 5 Dunne et al. (2005) in their critical review paper compare theoretical models mainly employed by defence economists. They conclude that the Feder-Ram model should be avoided within the defence economics literature, since it is prone to theoretical misinterpretation. The augmented Solow model used by Knight et al. (1996) has fewer theoretical weaknesses, but it is too narrow given the range of variables that have been found significant determinants of growth. The reformulation of the Barro model used by Aizenman and Glick (2006) , which allows for security effects on output is more promising and has the comparative advantage to explain both military expenditures and output.
The standard errors of the respective threshold levels are computed using the delta method.
However it is of note that in small samples, the delta method is known to result in excessively large standard errors.
As an additional robustness check, outliers are singled out using a strategy advocated by Belsley et al. (1980) that involves the application of the DFITS statistic to identify the countries associated with high combinations of residual and leverage statistics.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The initial analysis is based on a balanced dynamic panel dataset consisting of 89 countries over the 1970-2010 period. 6 To construct the panel dataset, non-overlapping five year intervals are used. This filters out short-run cyclical fluctuations, so that the analysis can focus on long-run growth effects (Aghion et al., 2009 ). The dependent variable, logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth, is constructed using data from the Penn World Tables   (PWT 7 .1). Log of initial income per capita is used as regressor.
Military spending is measured as the average ratio of military expenditures to GDP, using data collected from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbooks.
As online data tables relate only to the period from 1988 onwards, military expenditure shares for the previous periods are collected and inputted directly from the SIPRI Yearbooks in order to extend the time horizon. 7 The degree of threat measure employed is twofold: internal and external. To measure the internal threat level, the analysis employs two alternative proxies: internal conflict onset and internal conflict incidence. The former is measured as the fitted values of civil conflict onset from Fearon and Laitin (2003) . The projection of probabilities for onset is realized according 6 See Appendix Tables B and C for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 7 Data on military spending was initially collected for 173 countries starting from the period of 1959 as the PWT data on real GDP per capita is not available for most countries before this date. However, the time horizon was restricted to the period of 1970 and onwards because the measure of natural resources is available only since this date. Moreover, in order to maximise the number of countries for which data on military expenditure and real GDP per capita is available for most years, the balanced sample was limited to 113 countries. Due to lack of the data for other important control variables, the analysis was further constrained to the balanced sample of 89 countries.
to the specification of their original paper. 8 The latter is constructed using UCDP/PRIO conditional on war intensity measure is that the estimated effect might be driven by the future conflict that a country has not experienced yet at previous time period. Therefore, the analysis also employs an alternative measure of external threat incidence which is constructed using UCDP/PRIO data; and computed by counting the number of wars a country has been involved in conflict during non-overlapping five year intervals for the period of 1970-2010.
The measure of resource wealth is the resource rent provided by Hamilton and Ruta from the World Bank. 9 It includes two categories of natural resources: minerals and energy (oil, gas and coal); and is measured as the product of the quantity of resources extracted and the difference between the resource price and the unit cost of extraction.
Corruption is measured by the control of corruption index extracted from ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) data set. 10 The index has values ranging from a value of 0 (for very high corruption or very poor performance) to 6 (for very low corruption or excellent performance) and hence may be interpreted as an increasing index of government performance. 8 More specifically, the predicted values of civil conflict onset from model 2 of Table 1 This variable is employed from G-Econ data set collected by Yale University. Source:
http://gecon.yale.edu/data-and-documentation-g-econ-project 12 The geographical characteristics on soil and tropics are obtained from Nunn and Puga (2012) . Source:
http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 13 The geophysical characteristics most commonly found to influence conflict is the degree of high terrain, which is not directly linked to these geographical instruments.
14 Using the polity2 measure that ranges from -10 to 10, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find an insignificant impact of political regime type on civil conflict onset. However they suggest that anocracies, as defined by the middle of the polity index (ranging from -5 to 5) of political regime, are more susceptible to civil conflict than either pure democracies or pure dictatorships. Unpacking the anocracy measure, Vreeland (2008) finds that certain components of the polity index are defined with explicit reference to civil conflict, and when these components are removed from the polity index, the significant relationship between political regime and conflict disappears.
To check whether the arguments above alter the results, the analysis also used a dummy for democracy that any external threat, while this figure is almost the same for those who have experienced internal conflict. This might affect the economic impact of military expenditure on growth through external and internal conflict. The second facet of these statistics is that conflicts occur more frequently in relatively more resource abundant countries. The average natural resource shares increases when moving from the sample without any conflict experience to the sample with some conflict experience: from 2.391% (4.099%) to 5.608% (5.057%) for internal (external) threat. The third aspect is the obvious tendency that countries facing either external or internal threat tend to spend relatively more on the military sector compared with the sample facing no threat. Average military expenditure share increases when moving from the sample without any conflict experience to the sample with some conflict experience: from 2.479% (2.242%) to 2.980% (4.112%) for internal (external) threat. 15 Growth rate of population employed in the analysis is computed as log of n + g + δ, where n is average population growth rate; g is the rate of technical progress and δ is the rate of depreciation of the stock of physical capital investment and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05, following Mankiw et al. (1992) .
Empirical Results
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on threat levels are presented in Table 2 . Table 3 displays estimation results for the relationship between military spending and growth conditional on corruption levels. Tables 4-11 explore the relationship between military spending and growth concentrating on natural resources as a channel through conflict. Table 4 addresses the concerns of potential endogeneity problems in resource-conflict relationship. The results from the non-linear estimation of the relationship between military spending and growth conditional on natural resource wealth are reported in Table 5 . The subsequent tables report a number of sensitivity checks on the results from Table 5 . In particular, the analysis explores the robustness of the results to: alternative criteria for inclusion of the countries in the sample based on (i) importance of the shares from natural resource rents in the economy; (ii) dropping large commodity producers and (iii) subsets of countries with relatively intense conflict experiences that might potentially be induced by resource abundance; (iv) breaking down the resource wealth by commodity type (energy and oil resources); (v) alternative time windows; (vi) allowance for other non-linearities. Figure 1 illustrates how the impact of military spending on economic growth changes while the level of threat increases. Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of interest are achieved using partial regressions. 16 The plots indicate a significant negative impact of military expenditure on growth for the sample with no experience of conflict, while this effect is positive, albeit insignificant, for the sample with some conflict experience.
Military Expenditure and Growth: Threats
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on internal threat levels are presented in Table 2 . 17 The conjecture of this investigation follows the idea that the 16 Partial-regression estimates are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. Next, the fitted dependent variable is regressed against the fitted independent variable. In each case, the residuals of a growth regression on a set of variables are compared with the residuals of military expenditure regression on the same variables. The figures are produced using OLS regressions where growth and military expenditure are related linearly. 17 An analogous analysis of the relationship between military expenditure and growth conditional on external threat levels is reported in Appendix Table A1 . Overall the results confirm the findings from Aizenman and threat levels below (above) the probability level of 0.032.
As a check on the results, the growth equation is re-estimated according to the threshold levels where the separate linear specifications are estimated for the subsamples below and above the threshold level. 18 The associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation increase in military expenditure from splitting the data set into subsamples is estimated as -0.28 percentage points (significant) among low threat level countries, and -0.01 percentage points (insignificant) among high threat level countries. 19 Thus, these piece-wise linear specifications imply a relationship similar to that found in the specification that includes the interaction term between military expenditure and threat.
The last column in Table 2 employs alternative measure for internal threat levels using UCDP/PRIO data. The results are qualitatively similar and consistent to that found above.
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables enter mostly with the expected signs. Initial income exhibits a negative relationship with growth. Estimated coefficients on life expectancy and the investment ratio are positive, statistically significant, and typically indicate strong quantitative effects. Finally, the estimated effect of population growth, trade openness and schooling is typically insignificant. 18 The threshold value of 0.021 is used for the analysis of low and high internal threat sample. However note that any threshold value below 0.021 yields qualitatively similar results to that presented in Table 2 . 19 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by average standard deviation of 2.81, dividing by the time span between income observations (5 years), and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a percentage-point measurement.
As an additional robustness check, the analysis also considered the potential influence of several subsets of countries singled out due to the maintenance of high shares of military expenditure and on the basis of certain unusual aspects of their conflict experiences during the time period spanned by the sample. 20 Results of this exercise are reported in Appendix   Tables A2 and A3 where the results provide supportive evidence for the non-linear relationship conditional on threat levels as described above.
Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship between military expenditure and growth is only apparent among countries facing low threats, while in the presence of sufficiently high threats military expenditure is not significantly detrimental for growth, illustrating typically an insignificant impact.
Military Expenditure and Growth: Corruption
Previous studies suggest that the relationship between military expenditure and growth also depends on corruption and rent seeking behaviour (see e.g., Gupta et al., 2001 ; d'Agostino et al., 2012). In Table 3 , this association is examined more formally, where the hypothesis is As noted by Delavallade (2005) , the existence of corruption leads to a re-allocation of resources from more productive sectors towards less productive ones. As military spending generates more rents, projects in this sector are likely to involve larger amounts of money and may attract more and larger bribes. Overall, the magnitude of these results implies that corruption leads to increases in military spending, worsening the negative impact of the larger military sector on the economy's growth rate. 20 See Appendix A for description of additional robustness checks.
Military Expenditure and Growth: Natural Resources
The exploration now turns to relationships between military spending and growth concentrating on natural resources as a channel through conflict. As mentioned previously, a large body of the literature identifies natural resource wealth as a major determinant of civil conflict. The dominant causal link is that resources provide finance and motive (the "state prize" model). Others see natural resources as causing "political Dutch disease" or increasing rent-seeking and corruption activities, which in turn weaken state capacity leading to a fail of delivering key public goods and hence increase conflict possibility. If this is the case, the resource-conflict link is expected to impact the military spending and growth relationship.
This investigation supposes that if resource wealth is related to a higher risk of conflict, then the impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of natural resource wealth. In particular, the impact of military expenditure in the presence of a sufficiently large resource wealth would be positive, conditioning that natural resources are not associated with high corruption activities.
Estimation results of the analysis of the resource-conflict link are presented in Table 4 . The first two columns of the upper panel derives this relationship using ordinary least squares (OLS) where civil conflict onset linearly responds to initial income, natural resources and the set of control variables as employed in the benchmark analysis. The findings are very similar to those found in the existing literature, where all variables of interest take the expected signs.
Specifically, resource wealth leads to a higher probability of conflict, while a negative correlation is apparent for initial income. In both cases, initial income and resource wealth illustrate strong quantitative effects on probability of conflict onset.
In for the idea that the variables of interest are jointly endogenous, and that instrumenting for these variables is necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal relationship for the onset of conflict. 21 The test statistics for the instruments also confirm that they are appropriate: over-identification tests (Hansen J test) and the tests on the excluded instruments, all performed in linear regressions, show that the instruments are strong and properly exogenous. 22 The estimation results from the instrumental variables approach imply a qualitatively similar relationship to that found in the OLS specifications. Higher incomes attenuate the risk of conflict, while resource wealth is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict onset. Therefore, returning back to the relationship of military spending and growth conditional on resource wealth, the effect from military expenditure and resource interaction is expected to be positive.
The results from the non-linear estimation of this relationship are reported in Table 5 . The estimation results from these alternative approaches provide support for the supposition.
While military expenditure has a direct significant and negative effect on growth, the coefficients on the interaction terms with natural resources are positive, implying a positive differential impact of military expenditure. In particular, interaction terms under the first approach are significant and robust to the elimination of outliers. For the second approach, military expenditure is only significant for the case when it is interacted with resource wealth for countries with low corruption levels, and illustrates an insignificant impact for high 21 Separate endogeneity tests for the variables of interest fail to reject the exogeneity of initial income. However, natural resource wealth still enters endogenously. Therefore, the IV equation is also re-estimated by instrumenting only for natural resources; the results are qualitatively similar to that presented in Table 4 .
corruption levels, confirming the concerns regarding a potential contradictory effect induced by corruption.
In summary, the findings confirm the idea that resource wealth is related with a higher risk of conflict, and show that the impact of military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large resource wealth is positive once corruption levels are accounted for. Tables 7 and 8 . For each subset, Tables 7 and 8 report the list of countries, their average shares of natural resource rents, military expenditure and growth rates measured over the entire sample period, and the coefficient estimates obtained for interaction terms of military spending with natural resources as specified above for the first and the second approach. Table 7 addresses the plausible concern that high stakes from resource rents might incentivise conflict potential and affect motivation for rebels to enrich themselves. The investigation therefore excludes from the sample four subsets of countries: (i) those belonging to OPEC;
Robustness Checks
(ii) big oil and natural gas producers; (iii) large minerals and coal producers; and (iv) the union of these subsets. 23 In all cases, the results remain robust at least at the 10% significance level with coefficient estimates of the variables of interest lying within one standard deviation of the full-sample estimate. internal threat levels and high natural resource shares specified as those experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence and with natural resource levels above the mean; (ii) countries with high external threat levels and high natural resource shares defined as those experienced external threat more than approximately one standard deviation from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence and with natural resource levels above the mean; and (iii) the union of these subsets. The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms change very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under consideration. However, statistical significance of interaction term, as specified under the first approach, is somewhat altered in the case when the exclusion of the second and the third subsets are employed. Overall, the general pattern of results reported in Table 5 remains apparent given the exclusion of these countries from the sample. Table 9 deals with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that has been made in the literature is the role of energy and oil trading as a potential driver of conflict (Rosser, 2006 ; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007 and etc.), which is believed to induce higher risk of conflict, as they are generally more valuable and easier to control for the ruling elite.
Therefore columns 1-2 and 3-4 break down the resource wealth into energy and oil resources respectively. The results from both cases are consistent with findings from Table 5 .
Furthermore, the point estimates of interaction terms provide support to the belief that energy and oil resources in particular, are the crucial drivers of the impact of the natural resources on the conflict potential as mentioned above. 23 The investigation treats Indonesia as an OPEC country, as it belonged to the organisation for more than half Table 11 where columns 1 and 2 add the interactions of military expenditure, respectively, with initial logged income and the threat measure of conflict onset into the specification. 24 In all cases, the results remain robust. Moreover, note that all other interactions show a highly significant impact and take the correct sign. 25 Overall, the findings provide supportive evidence to the general pattern of results reported in Table 5 showing robust relationship between military expenditure and growth conditional on natural resource wealth. 24 The design of initial income interaction with military expenditure is an approach to place countries into income categories (see DeJong and Ripoll, 2006) . The evidence of a positive significant interaction term effect between military expenditure and initial income arises by differences in the impact of military expenditure on growth across different income groups. 25 An analogous analysis as in column 2 of Table 11 has been carried by employing military expenditure interaction with external instead of internal threat. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
Furthermore, in addition to investigating the internal and external threats separately as potential sources of positive externalities for the non-linear relationship between military spending and growth, the analysis also considered including military spending interactions with both type of threats into the model simultaneously. The results reveal a significant interaction effect of military spending only with internal threats. This is consistent with Kaldor's (1999) argument that the change in the nature of conflicts after the end of Cold-War era led to important changes in the frequency of civil or intra-state wars, illustrating dominance of internal conflicts over external conflicts (see Table 1 ). However this is not to argue that the role of external threats as a source of positive externality for the military spending and growth relationship should be underestimated.
Conclusion
The empirical analysis has confirmed that military expenditure in the presence of high external threats increases economic growth, while military expenditure driven by rent seeking and corruption reduces growth. In addition, the analysis provides evidence that such nonlinearity is also apparent when internal threats are considered. Extending the concept of the resource-conflict link, the analysis also contributes to the defence literature showing that military expenditure is less detrimental for countries with large natural resource wealth as long as the resource wealth is not associated with high corruption activities.
The empirical research was constrained by the limited availability of data for some countries Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on the probability of internal conflict onset, respectively, with and without outliers. Columns 3 and 4 apply the alternative approach to estimate the impact of military expenditure for countries with high and low internal threat levels. Column 5 employs UCDP/PRIO data to measure for internal threat incidence instead of conflict onset. All specifications control for time fixed effects. The excluded countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Egypt, Israel, Mali, Korea Rep. and Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, Israel, Korea Rep., Mali and Singapore; in column 4 are China and Uganda; and in column 5 are Botswana, China, Egypt and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. First stage results for instruments Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimates economic growth specification, respectively, with and without outliers. Column 3 applies instrumental variables approach using the specification as in column 2. In addition to variables of interest reported in the upper panel, all specifications control for military expenditure ratio, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. The excluded countries are China and Israel. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the estimation results, respectively, with and without outliers under the first estimation approach. Column 3 employs the second estimation approach using the "1 lag restriction" technique following Roodman (2009) and removing outliers. All specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Uganda; in column 3 are China, Mozambique and Uganda. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Note: Columns 1 and 2 exclude the countries below the 1 st decile of natural resource rents as a share of GDP (8 countries); columns 3 and 4 exclude countries below the 1 st quartile (18 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude countries below the median (39 countries). All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; estimates in square brackets are p-values. Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 5 . Big commodity producers reflect countries with more than 3% of total world supply which belong to the list of top 10 biggest producers in the world by commodity. Data for commodities produced in a country are obtained from the following sources: minerals (bauxite, copper, phosphates, tin, gold, gemstones and etc. Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 5 . Countries with high internal threat levels and high natural resource shares are specified as those experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. Countries with high external threat levels and high natural resource shares are specified as those experienced external threat more than 1 standard deviation from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The estimates are achieved using the "1 lag restriction" technique following Roodman (2009). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Column 2 employs probability of civil war onset as threat measure. All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses.
Appendices Appendix A: Robustness Checks for Threat Levels Analysis
Beyond the robustness checks described in Tables 2 and A1 for the analysis conditional Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship is only apparent among countries facing low threats, while in the presence of sufficiently high threats military expenditure is not materially detrimental for growth. Note: Columns 1 estimates military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on war intensity levels, while column 2 runs the same exercise excluding the potential outlier countries. Column 3 applies the alternative approach to estimate the impact of military expenditure for countries with different threat levels by interacting military expenditure with two separate dummy variables: one for countries facing low threats, and the other for countries with high threat levels where the average threshold value of 0.260 ((0.376+0.144)/2) is used for the analysis. Column 4 employs an alternative external threat incidence measure constructed using UCDP/PRIO data. The analysis of military expenditure and growth relationship conditional on external threat levels using GMM estimator demonstrates marginally insignificant impact for the interaction terms. Therefore column 4 reports Fixed effect estimates for the analysis of non-linear relationship conditional on external threat incidence following the majority of research analyses in the defence literature. Since the external threat measure of war intensity by construction is constant over time within a country, and thus is dropped when FE estimator is used, columns 1-3 employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimator instead of FE for the analysis of non-linear relationship conditional on war intensity levels. All specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Israel, and Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, China, Egypt, and Singapore; and in column 4 are Botswana, China, Egypt, Israel, Korea Rep. and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial income, internal threat (either onset or incidence measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. High military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in military sector. High internal threat level countries are specified as those experienced internal threat more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence. The poorest countries with high military expenditure shares and high external threat levels are specified as those are in the bottom of income distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in military sector and experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence. The estimation results are achieved using the "1 lag restriction" technique following Roodman (2009). Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial income, external threat (either intensity or incidence measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. High military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in military sector. High external threat level countries are specified as those experienced external threat more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence. The poorest countries with high military expenditure shares and high external threat levels are specified as those are in the bottom of income distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than average in military sector and experienced external threat above the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence.
